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Abstract  
 
Today’s law enforcement officers – both conservation and police – find themselves adapting to 
an emerging and dynamic threat environment.  Policies and practices aimed at the prevention of 
threats have focused primarily on federal, state, and local police agencies.  At a time when 
terrorists, extremists, and activists have begun to widen their array of attack methods, 
collaboration across all sectors of law enforcement becomes essential.  More specifically, an 
increased vulnerability to biological threats has not been met by steps to prevent or mitigate 
these threats.  Conservation officers have a unique and integral role to enhance homeland 
security efforts given their day-to-day operations and interactions with the community, especially 
rural America.  This article will discuss the role of conservation officers as it relates to homeland 
security – a significant conceptual component to research and practice that has largely been 
ignored by both academics and professionals.  The integration of conservation officers into the 
proactive information sharing environment will be discussed to strengthen a culture of 
information sharing as it pertains to an “all-threats, all-hazards” philosophy and to enhance 
national security awareness.  Moreover, this article will challenge the traditional range of threats 
associated with biological terrorism by providing an illustrative case study.    
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Conservation Officers: A Force Multiplier for Homeland Security  
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 (referred to hereafter as 9/11) brought about a 
new perspective for law enforcement – one based on threats as well as crimes.  Of course, law 
enforcement agencies were cognizant of threats prior to 9/11, but the types of threats and 
methods employed have since changed dramatically.  The emphasis of homeland security 
intelligence has sought to assist the law enforcement community in developing a level of 
situational awareness and preparedness for law enforcement personnel.  Threat methods have 
evolved from varying types of bombs and firearms to sophisticated types of biological agents and 
even species.1  Biological terrorism has thus far been largely examined in the context of weapons 
of mass destruction (Shea, 2004; Kronin, 2003), psychological terrorism (Crelinston, 1999; 
Parachini, 2001), and emergency management (Rotz et al., 2002; Waeckerle, 2000).  However, 
the emergence of new biological threat methods has created an environment in which law 
enforcement must rely on more than technological hardware in attempts to detect such threats.  
Prevention and mitigation of such threats can be achieved through increased collaboration via 
information sharing practices among conservation officers, police officers, and the community. 
 Building from the information sharing practices established in state and local policing, 
specifically law enforcement intelligence, we propose these same practices should be applied by 
conservation officers in their efforts to prevent and mitigate biological terrorism threats as well 
as environmental crimes.  The practices emphasized in this discussion are informal and thus 
require minimal resource commitment yet simultaneously yield significant prevention results as 
well as professional collaboration.  Homeland security efforts are in a position to capitalize on an 
existing rural American infrastructure already established by conservation officers throughout 
the United States.  Such an approach could enhance existing homeland security preparedness and 
prevention and is long overdue as conservation officers continue to receive different training and 
mission mandates than their police counterparts.  This difference is likely rooted in the 
assumption that combating terrorism and other threats is outside the purview of conservation 
officers.  This could not be further from the case.  By developing training programs and revising 
mission mandates of conservation officers, the prevention and preparedness capability for U.S. 
homeland security can be enhanced.   
 
 
IMPACT OF CONSERVATION OFFICERS FOR HOMELAND SECURITY 
 
There is no agreed upon definition of what exactly constitutes a conservation officer and 
their duties vary from state to state.  In most states, conservation officers are considered state law 
enforcement officers and have broad law enforcement authority.  For purposes of this discussion, 
the term “conservation officer” refers to any personnel, whether they be employed by the state, 
county, municipality, or even privately contracted, who is responsible for the enforcement of 
violations against natural resources and whose primary operational jurisdiction is located in rural 
areas outside the normal patrol or day-to-day activity of state or local police.  The authors 
recognize that many conservation officers are responsible for jurisdictions within populous areas 
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and present discussion is not intended to overlook these officers – in fact, the issues to be 
discussed are applicable to these officers as well.  However, these populous areas are likely to 
have multiple law enforcement entities (sheriffs, municipal police, state police, etc.) and have 
more well-established mechanisms for sharing threat-related information.  As such, populous 
areas stand to benefit from the formal integration of conservation officers into the homeland 
security mission, but such a benefit is likely to be significantly greater in rural areas where the 
density of law enforcement presence is minimal.  
Though instances do exist where conservation departments have acknowledged their 
roles in homeland security prevention and preparedness (for example see the North East 
Conservation Law Enforcement Chiefs Association, 2013), these instances are the exception 
rather than the rule.  As homeland security roles vary across state and local law enforcement 
agencies (Schafer et al, 2009), the same holds true for conversation agencies.  While there has 
been no research to date examining the extent to which type of assignments conservation officers 
are tasked, it is believed most conservation departments facilitate the homeland security mission 
primarily through the patrol of waterways (especially those that are adjacent to a public utility 
such as a hydroelectric dam) and assisting the U.S. Coast Guard (for example see State of 
Connecticut, 2013).  Of the limited research to date on conservation officers’ duties and 
assignments, a consistent them has been that conservation officers are becoming increasingly 
responsible for enforcement beyond wildlife and natural resource-related violations.  Such 
expanded responsibilities included, but are not limited to, drug and alcohol offenses, stolen 
firearms, stolen recreational vehicles, and subjects with outstanding warrants (Eliason, 2007).  
Furthermore, it has been found that conservation officers are becoming responsible for providing 
assistance to other police and law enforcement agencies and apprehending criminal suspects and 
escaped convicts (Falcone, 2004).  These tasks go beyond the traditional purview of conservation 
officers and, when coupled with broad law enforcement jurisdiction that many conservation 
officers maintain, shift conservation officers closer to state and local police along the law 
enforcement continuum.  Currently, the role of conservation officers in homeland security is 
largely concentrated on protecting waterways and shorelines.  During their normal patrols, 
conservation officers can encounter illicit activities connected with threats to homeland security 
– such as discovering a site to grow marijuana that is being worked by illegal aliens with 
potential ties to drug smuggling on the southwest U.S. - Mexico border. Sometimes, 
conservation officers are the individuals who are the first to identify members of such criminal 
networks and often times have broader risk implications (Gore, 2011). 
The integration of conservation officers into the homeland security framework is similar 
to current steps being taken within the public health sector.  In an attempt to have adequate early 
warning systems as well as improved communication of health-related information that may 
have implications for the broader U.S. population, public health offices and personnel are being 
formally connected with state and regional fusion centers to enhance the sharing of health-related 
information (Carter and Rip, Online First).  In theory, and hopefully in practice when such 
capacities become fully operational, the awareness and information sharing capability of public 
health personnel will facilitate possible threat information to state and local law enforcement.  
While the notion of public health notifying law enforcement of possible health threats has 
occurred before, it has traditionally operated on a reactionary basis.  The current model allows 
public health personnel to provide information that is indicative of an emerging, or possible, 
threat before the threat actually reaches fruition.  This same approach should be employed using 
conservation officers.  As currently structured, conservation officers report information to state 
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and local law enforcement after an incident has occurred which they believe will be of interest to 
their state and local law enforcement partners (such as finding drug growing on a mountainside 
or a methamphetamine lab in a cabin).  However, given a lack of conservation officers included 
in post-9/11 law enforcement training programs and initiatives as compared to traditional state 
and local law enforcement as a result of their legislative jurisdiction to focus on violations 
involving natural resources, it is reasonable to assume a proactive information sharing process do 
not currently exist with the majority of conservation entities.  This is troubling given the 
significant presence conservation officers have in the United States. 
Approximately 95% of the United States is considered to be a rural environment (U.S. 
Census Bureau, 2002) – the type of areas in which conservation officers spend more time 
patrolling than perhaps any other law enforcement agency.  As such, conservation officers are in 
a unique position to strengthen homeland security initiatives by nature of their role in the 
criminal justice system.  Tasked with enforcement responsibilities of crimes and violations 
typically found in areas of low human population density, especially rural America, conservation 
officers are in a position to strengthen information sharing and community awareness in areas of 
the United States that typically do not receive concentrated or dedicated homeland security-
related attention as a result of their location not being within the proximity of an urban area.  A 
significant portion of preventive and preparedness homeland security capabilities in the U.S. are 
driven by funding from the Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) which relies on a risk formula 
to calculate preparedness expenditures.  The factors considered for this formula include 
population, potential targets, and vulnerability – thus making it impossible for rural areas to 
receive much, if any, preparedness funding for training and awareness programs.  As a result of 
these funding constraints, the focus of preventive and preparedness efforts are on urban areas due 
to human population density and the number of potential terrorist targets as identified in the 
Target Capabilities List mentioned previously and not rural America – creating a gap in 
homeland security capabilities.  This discussion could be further extended to United States Park 
Police as they are commonly tasked to protect monuments (e.g., Mount Rushmore) and natural 
features (e.g. Niagara Falls) that are common destinations for tourists and hold high symbolic 
value – two significant components weighed by terrorists when selecting potential targets 
(Damphousse et al., 2003).  However, given space considerations, the discussion throughout this 
article will focus on state and local conservation officers.  By utilizing informal information 
sharing practices and partnerships with local communities and businesses, conservation officers 
can strengthen the homeland security gap in rural America.  
 
Utilizing Citizens of Rural Areas as Sources of Information  
 The reliance on American citizens for purposes of gathering raw information to be 
included in the intelligence cycle is emphasized within HSPD-8.  In an effort to enhance national 
preparedness, HSPD-8 designates the importance of information sharing and collaboration to 
enable effective prevention, protection, response, and recovery activities; specifically noting that 
“…effective terrorism prevention, protection, response, and recovery efforts depend on timely 
and accurate information” and that this is effort is most likely achieved through “collecting, 
blending, analyzing, and evaluating relevant information from a broad array of sources on a 
continual basis,” (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2005, 13).   
More specifically, the U.S. is comprised of an already established information sharing 
and educational network known as conservation districts.  This network represents 2,946 local 
conservation districts2 (National Association of Conservation Districts, 2012).  Though these 
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districts were created for the purpose of strengthening natural resources across the U.S., they 
represent a formal infrastructure already in existence that provides unique education and training 
for citizens – such as land management and hunter education.  These seminars are often 
delivered in collaboration with conservation officers in the local community.  Through these 
established educational mechanisms, conservation officers could provide a community 
awareness seminar on suspicious activity reporting, signs of terrorism planning, biological 
terrorism, and criminal behavior. Such programs could be implemented at minimal or no cost to 
taxpayers or additional strain on department budgets.  Many of these threat-based training 
materials are accessible at no cost to government agencies from the U.S. Department of Justice 
and the Office for Community Oriented Policing Service.  Information received from community 
members as a result of these educational seminars could be shared with an intelligence liaison 
officer or state fusion center.  Through this approach, conservation officers and their daily 
interactions with rural America could be leveraged by state and local law enforcement as a force 
multiplier.  For purposes of this discussion, rural America is a general reference to geographic 
areas of the U.S. which are primarily low in population density and typically receive less formal 
attention and resources with respect to homeland security.  The ratio of conservation officers to 
traditional law enforcement personnel is higher than would be found in more populated areas of 
the U.S. – simply given the business and recreational nature of these areas.   
Moreover, there is currently a shortcoming with respect to the level of homeland security 
preparedness among rural American areas.  Specifically, rural area residents are reported to 
believe the terror threat in rural areas to be minimal, yet rural communities have expressed a 
desire to be formally educated regarding potential threats (Eller, 2010).  As it has been discussed, 
conservation districts could provide information and training to their constituents in the course of 
the duties they already provide and the consistent contacts they have with farmers, ranchers, and 
large private landowners in remote areas.  These persons could participate in a formal program to 
exchange information gathered through a suspicious activity reporting function.  Furthermore, 
conservation officers stand to impact rural communities by educating the community about 
dangerous conditions or hazardous materials potentially located on or around their property 
(Eller, 2010).  Ranchers and farmers typically employ the use of pesticides (e.g. ammonium 
nitrate) and herbicides during the course of their seasonal farming activities and not all have the 
most current information or capacity to use, dispose, or secure those materials safely.   
The effectiveness of intelligence relies on the collection and analysis of raw information.  
Information is collected from the environments that agencies wish to develop an understanding 
of what potential threats and/or problems may exist within the environment.  The number of 
environments within the United States that do not have a conservation officer component are 
severely limited and thus the number of environments which stand to benefit from information 
collected via conservation officers is paramount.  If all potential information from an 
environment is not integrated into the intelligence process, it cannot be considered when 
developing prevention and preparedness responses.  As such, law enforcement organizations are 
left with an incomplete threat picture and the probability of identifying threats before they reach 
fruition is diminished.   
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LAW ENFORCEMENT INTELLIGENCE 
 
As a result of the events on 9/11, American law enforcement is currently experiencing a 
shift in policing philosophies.  Building on the foundations of community policing (Carter & 
Carter, 2009; McGarrell et al, 2007), intelligence-led policing has emerged as the most 
promising philosophy to date (Ratcliffe, 2008).  The underlying intent of intelligence-led 
policing is to create a policing organization that utilizes intelligence to influence strategic 
planning for the allocation of resources in order to have the greatest impact on crime in the most 
effective and efficient manner possible.  Moreover, intelligence-led policing is designed to 
achieve this through the analysis of raw information for purposes of identifying precursors to 
threats and crime. Thus, intelligence-led policing mitigates crimes and threats by removing the 
conditions that facilitate crimes and threats.  Even though the management and sharing of 
intelligence is regulated via specific guidelines and laws,3 intelligence largely relies on 
informalities and rapport between persons (Weiss, 1998).  The informal aspect of intelligence-led 
policing is often found in the context of community partnerships, professional friendships and 
even personal relationships and the social networks they create.  These contexts provide a 
significant amount of the raw information that is moved into the intelligence process.  The 
intelligence process is the systematic, scientific, and logical methodology to comprehensively 
understand information by which actionable intelligence is the result (Carter, 2009).   
 
Intelligence-Led Policing  
Intelligence-led policing is designed as a mechanism for information sharing both within 
law enforcement agencies and between all members of the community.  The concept of 
intelligence-led policing aids law enforcement agencies in identifying threats and developing 
responses to prevent those threats from reaching fruition in America’s communities 
(International Association of Chiefs of Police, 2002).  Despite an increased demand for 
information sharing partnerships among agencies there remains a common misunderstanding of 
how this will be achieved and which agencies or organizations must be active members of this 
process (McGarrell et al., 2007).  Although the adoption of best practices for sharing homeland 
security intelligence is a critical component of intelligence-led policing – and thus is 
acknowledged here – we focus our discussion on the informal practices of information sharing 
among law enforcement agencies, as well as their communities, and how this information can be 
used to prevent threats rather than the adoption of intelligence-led policing as a fully integrated 
operational philosophy by conservation agencies.  
 There is no universally accepted definition of intelligence-led policing, although the 
components of most definitions are similar.  The Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA) produced 
an unpublished memorandum which was intended to guide the solicitation and review of 
violence reduction grants using intelligence-led policing processes (U.S. Department of Justice, 
2007).  The conceptual foundation of intelligence-led policing provided in this memorandum 
was articulated as building on the best practices of problem-oriented policing and CompStat and 
applying these principles to a threat-based environment.  In the document, BJA stated, 
“intelligence-led policing can be defined as a collaborative law enforcement approach combining 
problem-solving policing and information sharing…(U.S. Department of Justice, 2007, p.1).”  
Building on this conceptual foundation, Carter and Carter (2009) provided an operational 
definition of intelligence-led policing as: 
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“The collection and analysis of information related to crime and conditions that 
contribute to crime, resulting in an actionable intelligence product intended to aid law 
enforcement in developing tactical responses to threats and/or strategic planning related 
to emerging or changing threats (p.317).” 
A critical component of this definition is the emphasis of collecting raw information that 
feeds the intelligence process and information sharing.  Collection should be focused to identify 
and understand threats that emerge within a jurisdiction.  Within the context of applying this 
practice to conservation officers, the focus of information collection should be determined by the 
chief decision maker or the executive of the organization.  This individual will define 
information collection requirements based on information received from both officers and 
citizens in the form of suspicious activity reports (SARs).   
The intelligence-led policing philosophy relies on a significant analytic component – or 
effective problem solving skills.  It relies on deductive and inductive reasoning to define 
requirements and forecast threats (Ratcliffe, 2008).  Analysis may be quantitative, notably for 
strategic analysis, but it is frequently qualitative for both tactical and strategic analysis.  Since 
intelligence-led policing focuses on threats, it becomes essential to identify variables within a 
community and the surrounding region that support the generation and maturation of threats.  
Gathering information about these variables is vital to be included in the intelligence cycle.  
More specifically, variables attributing to threats can include on-going criminal activity, trends 
of new or emerging criminal activity, and presence of extremist or activist groups.  The 
information collected must provide insight on the existence of the conditions and individuals 
who may be involved in potential threats.  Another critical element of the analytic process is to 
produce what is referred to as “actionable intelligence.”  Fundamentally, for intelligence to be 
useful it must provide direction for developing and executing plans.  A law enforcement agency 
must be able to utilize intelligence products and develop activities or practices that prevent or 
mitigate the potential threat.  An agency must be able to use the information in an operational 
manner.  Moreover, actionable intelligence should ensure that the right information is placed into 
the hands of the right people who can influence a potential threat. 
The next step of actionable intelligence is the provision of both tactical and strategic 
analysis.  Depending on the type of threat, a wide range of tactical responses may be appropriate.  
Intelligence from tactical analysis overwhelmingly focuses on prevention where the use of 
information related to threats is utilized to develop strategies that will eliminate or mitigate short-
term and immediate threats (Kelling & Bratton, 2006).  Also, threats within a community 
typically change over time.  Strategic analysis is primarily used longitudinally to plan and 
allocate resources in an attempt to understand the changing nature of a threat environment 
(Carter, 2009).  Information is provided to decision makers about the changing nature, 
characteristics, and methodologies of threats and emerging threats for the purpose of developing 
response strategies and reallocating resources accordingly.  When strategic analysis is used, 
plans may be developed to either prevent a threat from maturing or mitigate the threat should it 
emerge.   
 
 
Homeland Security Intelligence 
 The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) demonstrated the importance of threat 
prevention beyond terrorism when the White House established the Homeland Security 
Presidential Directive-8 (HSPD-8), “…to prevent, respond to, and recover from threatened and 
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actual domestic terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies…(U. S. Department of 
Homeland Security, 2003, p.h).”  A salient component of this executive order focused on law 
enforcement personnel and what was determined to be their critical knowledge, skills, abilities 
and processes that were necessary for law enforcement and emergency services personnel to 
perform effective threat prevention.  Such characteristics of law enforcement are referred to as 
capabilities.  These capabilities have been articulated in detail within the Target Capabilities List 
(TCL) published in 2007 by DHS.  Designed to protect the United States from all hazards, 
“…the TCL is a national-level, generic model of operationally ready capabilities defining all-
hazards preparedness” (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2007, 1).  The list is divided into 
multiple sections associated with prevention and response.  In the “Prevent Mission” section 
there are two specific law enforcement intelligence-related target capabilities:  “Information 
Gathering and Recognition of Indicators and Warnings” and “Intelligence Analysis and 
Production” (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2007).  Importantly, these developments 
created a new component of law enforcement intelligence that must be integrated into a 
contemporary form of intelligence practices known as “homeland security intelligence,” which 
has been defined as… 
…the collection and analysis of information concerned with non-criminal domestic 
threats to critical infrastructure, community health and public safety for the purpose of 
preventing the threat or mitigating the effects of the threat (Carter, 2009, 442). 
These new intelligence responsibilities have emerged within the homeland security 
framework that intelligence activities at the state, local and conservation levels must assess 
threats posed by all-hazards.  Given a significant continuum of potential threats that fall under 
the auspice of homeland security intelligence, the key challenge is for law enforcement agencies 
to focus on threats posed by hazards that have implications for public safety and order 
maintenance responsibilities in addition to criminal threats.  Thus, another component entered 
into the intelligence equation.  The most recent evolution of law enforcement intelligence related 
to the current discussion was the creation of the Information Sharing Environment (ISE) as 
required by the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA) of 2004.  Despite the 
focus of this legislation on the federal Intelligence Community, nearly one-third of the actionable 
recommendations in the Information Sharing Environment Implementation Plan are directed 
toward state and local law enforcement.   
The ISE seeks to “…implement an effective, widespread culture of information sharing, 
balanced with a need for security…” (Program Manager – Information Sharing Environment, 
2007, 63). This plan provides a detailed process and action plan that indicate expectations for 
state and local law enforcement (to include conservation officers) to be participants in the ISE.  
The essence of information sharing and generation of raw information at the state, local, and 
conservation levels is intended to be via intelligence-led policing.  Paramount to the current 
discussion is the importance of critical infrastructure protection.  DHS identified five critical 
areas to be designated as law enforcement intelligence priorities – one of which is threats to the 
critical infrastructure and key resources (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2009). These 
threat assessments aim to define all hazard infrastructure risk for risk-based prioritization and 
decision making.  
 In the wake of 9/11, law enforcement has perhaps undergone the most dramatic overhaul 
of practices, policies and initiatives as compared to the rest of society.  These changes are largely 
related to threat prevention and mitigation and the sharing of information and intelligence.  Like 
many organizations of complex size and structure, these changes are still in the works and far 
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from being implemented in many cases and in others are far from being effective.  However, 
great strides have been gained by the majority of federal, state, and local policing agencies.  
Aiding their efforts has been an enormous amount of federal recommendations for best practices 
to help bridge the information gaps identified in the 9/11 Commission Report.  The goal of this 
discussion is to identify a gap in homeland security information sharing an awareness that can 
best be filled by conservation officers as a result of their existing infrastructure and role within 
the U.S. law enforcement community.  The practices emphasized in this discussion are informal 
and thus require minimal resource commitment while simultaneously yielding significant 
prevention results as well as professional collaboration.   
 
Community Partnerships 
 The Heritage Report on Homeland Security proposes a number of empirically-based 
recommendations for keeping the nation safe from threats.  The first recommendation focuses 
heavily on the role of community for both information collection and planning efforts (Heritage, 
2002).  The community, or jurisdiction area, is typically the primary and oftentimes first source 
of information as a result of their everyday interactions with their own environment.  In some 
instances, the community is the only source of critical information.  This can be likened to the 
force multiplier effect – the community acting as the “eyes and ears” of law enforcement.  
Policing agencies across the country have realized it is not a question of should the community 
be involved, but what is the best way to develop and nurture an effective partnership. 
 Community partnerships operate best when an educational or training program is 
provided from within the community (Heritage, 2002).  In these instances, law enforcement 
personnel can use, for example, interactive and informal communication techniques to relay 
educational topics focused on different types of terrorism, indicators or terrorism planning, or 
suspicious activity.  These sessions could also include an awareness component, since the 
community members attending the educational session are able to serve as “eyes and ears” for 
law enforcement. Awareness includes the ability to identify and observe suspicious activity, how 
to report it, and what will happen next. Community members must receive continuous feedback 
so they are aware about the extent to which their efforts are making an impact.  Most 
importantly, these educational sessions must conclude with guiding information for the 
community members.  Law enforcement must provide citizens with the ability to “follow-up” if 
they have questions after the session.  
 The majority of American law enforcement agencies already have experience – or at least 
a fundamental knowledge – developing relationships with the local community given the 
evolution of community-oriented policing over the past 20 years.  Intelligence-led policing 
simply builds on the institutional structures already put in place by community policing to 
include a more preventive, threat-based approach to awareness. Community engagement is 
certainly not a new phenomenon for conservation officers, as they have been practicing these 
relationships for decades in the form of hunter education programs, forest fire prevention 
initiatives, and safety programs for off-road vehicles, boating, and snowmobiling.  Intelligence-
based information sharing builds on these already-cultivated skills practiced by conservation 
officers and enhances them to include a broader array of potential threats.   
 
 
 
 
10 
 
Public-Private Partnerships 
 Similar to community partnerships, law enforcement has identified the need to develop 
partnerships with the private sector.  Scholars traditionally examine these partnerships in the 
context of third-party policing (Mazerolle & Ransley, 2005) or private security (Jones & 
Newburn, 1998).  However, scholars, law enforcement, and private sector businesses have begun 
to recognize the benefits involved with information sharing partnerships.  Moreover, a demand 
for such partnerships was identified in the 9/11 Commission Report (National Commission on 
Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, 2004), the Government Accountability Office 
(government Accountability Office, 2007), the National Strategy for Homeland Security 
(Executive, 2002), the National Criminal Intelligence Sharing Plan (Global Intelligence 
Working Group, 2003), and the Fusion Center Guidelines (Global Intelligence Working Group, 
2005).   
 Public-private partnerships work in a similar fashion to community partnerships, but tend 
to be more formal as a result of potential impacts to private company’s bottom lines.  More 
specifically, public-private partnerships rely on the same two-way communication and individual 
rapports among members, but they rely on formal memorandums of understanding that protect 
classified and proprietary information.  These forms of partnerships can be characterized by their 
ongoing, trusting relationship between law enforcement and private entities for information 
sharing purposes with the goal of proactively identifying threats (Carter, 2009).  Members from 
the private sector provide raw information, as well as analyzed intelligence products, to be 
included in the intelligence process while law enforcement members provide intelligence to the 
private sector on relevant threats.  The identification of relevant threats is the product of the 
intelligence analysis process.  This partnership model provides a road-map for basic 
implementation and the communication of information can be bi-directional where law 
enforcement is providing the private company with information to safeguard against threats to 
their business.  For example, if a law enforcement agency becomes aware of an activist rally 
planned in protest of commercial fishing for shark fins, and has an established partnership with a 
commercial cruise line that operates out of the same port as the commercial fishermen, law 
enforcement can provide advanced information to the cruise company in the event the rally has 
an impact on the cruise company's day-to-day operations – and thus their financial bottom line.  
These relationships are commonly viewed in a “quid-pro-quo” fashion (Carter, 2008).  
  
 
Suspicious Activity Reporting 
All agencies – regardless of size or jurisdiction – have a role in the nationwide SAR 
Initiative (U.S. Department of Justice, 2009).  The sharing of SAR information among local, 
state, and federal agencies is a critical element to prevent and mitigate attacks on American soil - 
ranging from personal armed attack to biological terrorism.  Suspicious activity reporting (SAR), 
known also as “tips and leads” (Carter, 2009), is an on-going initiative to identify, collect and 
manage information on suspicious behaviors and is being coordinated by the Global Intelligence 
Working Group, Program Manager’s Information Sharing Environment, and the Intelligence and 
Analysis Directorate of the Department of Homeland Security.  There are three types of SARs – 
financial, all-crimes and information sharing environment.  Financial SARs were initiated by the 
Bank Secrecy Act of 1970 in an effort to identify money laundering, racketeering and trafficking.  
All-crimes SARs are the most general and refer to any suspicious activity that can be related to 
any crime and is typically reported to a police officer.  An example of an all-crimes SAR could 
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be a community member witnessing someone in a ski-mask walking around a parking lot and 
checking car doors to see if they were locked.  Information sharing environment SARs are 
concerned with suspicious behavior related to possible terrorist incidents.  An example could be 
witnessing a person taking photographs of the structural areas of bridges or buildings (e.g., 
underneath a bridge where no “normal” pictures would be traditionally taken).   
The third type of SAR is of great concern to state and local law enforcement; all-crimes 
SARs carry the most relevant information to law enforcement's day-to-day operations – this is 
consistent with the approach that could be taken by conservation officers as they attempt to 
address a range of criminal actives related to the natural environment.  This is not to say state 
and local agencies do not accept or record financial or information sharing environment SARs 
because they do, but will typically move this information along to the proper jurisdiction or 
entity that could analyze the information as a host of state, local, and even federal organizations 
have SAR processing responsibilities.   
 
 
AN EMERGING BIOLOGICAL TERRORISM THREAT 
 
 The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) defines biological terrorism as a 
planned release of viruses, germs or toxins in order to harm or kill citizens and that likely modes 
of transmission include aerosol, food, water or insects (U.S. Department of Health and Human 
Services, 2001).  Bioterrorism commonly focuses on the dispersion of biological agents intended 
to harm citizens, such as anthrax.  However, individuals who aim to use biological species as a 
method of attack have largely gone unrecognized by the DHS, the CDC, or any other 
organization tasked with threat prevention and mitigation.  It is perhaps best to keep in mind key 
factors that determine what incidents are considered terrorism.  There is no specific definition of 
a terrorist act, however a recent congressional report identified terrorist acts as involving the use, 
or threat of use, of any method of attack that is driven by an ideological motivation (Bjelopera, 
2013).  The use of biological species as a method of terrorist attack was specifically mentioned 
in this report as an emerging likelihood to be utilized by animal rights extremists and 
environmental extremists.     
The introduction of an invasive species into an environment unnatural to that species with 
the intent to do biological harm to the environment is an emerging form of bioterrorism.  
Invasive, or alien or exotic, species are characterized by being aggressive, prolific breeders, and 
rapid disperses.  Invasive species out-compete native species, can introduce parasites and/or 
disease, prey on native species, can adversely alter habitat, and pose significant ecological and 
economic consequences (McConnell & Abel, 2008).  Many examples exist that scholars have 
identified as posing threats to humans and our economy.  Feral pigs can be used to carry the 
Nipah virus and spread disease to humans and wildlife.  Striga is a plant parasite that can destroy 
corn crops and subsequently devastate agricultural commodity markets and bio-fuel production.  
The heartwater pathogen, a microbe that can cause heart and pulmonary edema, is carried by the 
tropical bont-tick and can kill large mammals, other wildlife, and can potentially be transmitted 
to humans.  Lastly, barberry plants are frequently eaten by a variety of birds whose droppings 
spread wheat stem rust which can cause a decline or destruction of wheat production (Heather 
and Hallman, 2007).  
Precedent of such examples include the invasion of multiple aquatic species in San 
Francisco Bay in the late 1980s, such as the invasive clam species from Asia  called 
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Potamocorbula Amurinsis and in the 1990s an extremely prolific aquatic weed native to Asia, 
known as hydilla, interfered with water usage, displaces native species, and impacted local 
fishing economies (Pratt, 2003).  Across California in 1990, the glassy winged sharpshooter - 
which hosts the bacterium Xylella Fastidiosa – caused Pierce’s Disease in grapes, which infects 
and kills the grape vine.  Severe outbreaks of the disease necessitated destruction of diseased 
plants and a major replanting of grape vines, resulting in a reduction in grape production and a 
40 million dollar lost to the grape-related industries in California (Souder, 2000).   
Bioterrorism, closest resembling that of environmental terrorism or warfare (Schofield, 
1999), creates a significant threat to the United States homeland.  Such threats pose a significant 
challenge to our defense mechanisms and provide a unique and well-suited opportunity for 
conservation officers to enhance homeland security efforts.  The following case study is provided 
to serve as an example of how an invasive species can be used as a method of terrorism.  It is not 
provided to be analyzed as a table-top exercise or an instance in which specific action-steps for 
improvement can be identified.  As noted by a leading expert in the field and National Guard 
Colonel Robert J. Pratt (2004), “Terrorist adversaries will not overlook the overwhelming impact 
that invasive species could have on the United States” (p. 47).  
 
Zebra Mussels as a Terrorist Threat 
The following case study example was identified through a Department of Homeland 
Security-funded grant project.  Because the investigation is on-going, no unique identifiers are 
presented.  Zebra mussels (Dreissena Polymorpha) are native to Eurasia and are considered to be 
"invasive" outside their normal range.  In 1988 they were introduced into the Midwestern U.S.'s 
Lake St. Clair through ballast water discharged from a transoceanic vessel (Southeast Ecological 
Science Center, 2012).  Zebra mussels grow in dense clusters and are known for clogging pipes, 
valves, and drains that affect drinking water, hydroelectric plants, and manufacturing firms 
(O’Neill, Jr., 1993). The animals are relatively small and easily transported by most any kind of 
container such as a plastic bag, jar, or bucket. They can survive out of the water for several days 
in cool, humid conditions by tightly closing their shell (O’Neill, Jr., 1993). Zebra mussels 
impose significant negative effects on the ecosystems they inhabit and represent one of the most 
important biological invasions into North America in recent time (Pace et al., 1998). 
Economic impacts of zebra mussels have not been examined in detail since the mid-
1990s, although predictions have ranged as high as $1 billion per year (Connelly et al., 2007; 
Pimentel, 2005).  Moreover, the over-land transportation of boats, motors, and trailers poses one 
of the greatest risks for spreading zebra mussels as larger mussels can live out of water for up to 
three days.  The discussion to this point has demonstrated the potential negative impact zebra 
mussels can have on American society – from recreational to ecological to economic.  Until 
recently, these potential consequences were credited by natural resource, utility, and other 
decision-makers to natural or unintended progression across aquatic ecosystems.  This way of 
thinking was challenged when an individual publically threatened to purposefully deploy zebra 
mussels as a method of terrorism. A Congressman from a Midwestern state was a vocal 
supporter of legislation to ban Internet gaming in the U.S.  An individual who opposed this 
legislation made a threat to the Congressman’s office that if the Congressman voted in favor of 
the Internet gaming ban, the individual would purposefully introduce zebra mussels into the 
freshwater lakes within the Congressman’s home state that were, at the time, un-infested.  The 
Congressman subsequently voted for the ban on Internet gaming.  At the time of this article, 
zebra mussels have since appeared in lakes within the Congressman’s state.  
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Ecologists consider zebra mussels to be highly invasive.  Between 1998 and 2007, 23 
U.S. states and 2 Canadian Provinces were invaded, as were all 5 of the Great Lakes, inland 
lakes in 9 states and 21 rivers. Ecologists speculate the mussels will continue to spread into 
additional rivers and inland lakes that are currently uninfected but within range of the invasion 
based on environmental and geological variables. Connelly et al. (2007) surveyed water 
treatment facilities within known zebra mussel range and reported that respondents thought zebra 
mussels had been in the facility for 6 months to 1 year before discovery; only 20% of responding 
facilities had preventative measures in place prior to the discovery of zebra mussels. Given the 
ecological and human dimensions of zebra mussel invasions and management, it is possible that 
zebra mussels appeared in the case study lake as part of the "natural" ecological invasion of 
mussels through the Midwest and that the officials were not aware of the mussel invasion 
because, like Connelly et al. (2007) found, they were not actively looking for them. Officials 
only searched for the mussels after the threat was made. Regardless of when or how the zebra 
mussels arrived in the case study lake, the fact that a bioterrorist threat was made by a constituent 
in response to an impending policy decision illustrates that there were no biosecurity safeguards 
in place at the time. Thus, the possibility of such a threat is extremely viable as is our nation's 
vulnerability to such a threat in the future. 
Zebra mussels are explicitly included in the United States Code 42 USC 42 and 43 – also 
known as the Lacey Act.  Under this code, the transportation of zebra mussels is a federal 
misdemeanor (U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, 2012).  If an individual intentionally causes 
damage or loss of property as a result of the purposeful introduction of zebra mussels, or 
conspires to do so, this can be classified under the federal crime of Animal Enterprise Terrorism 
which is punishable as a felony depending on the value of property loss (Congress, 2006).  Thus, 
the threat of introducing an invasive species into a freshwater ecosystem represents a felony and 
this act serves as a legislative tool to criminally prosecute violators.  Furthermore, if such an act 
is determined to be motivated by an ideological purpose (e.g. Animal Liberation Front or 
Environmental Liberation Front), it can be classified as an act of domestic terrorism (Bjelopera, 
2013).   
To provide further context of biological threats, an example of a more method of utilizing 
biological agents as a threat is provided.  While conservation officers should not be synonymous 
with rural America, they spend a majority of their time in rural areas in proportion to traditional 
local or state law enforcement.  Within rural America is where most of the country’s cattle 
industry can be found.  Foot and mouth disease (aphthovirus), a highly infectious disease that 
infects cloven-hoofed animals and holds potential harm to both human health as well as key 
resources in the United States.  For example, in Dodge City, Kansas, the cattle industry 
represents a $500,000 per day key resource for the region in which the vast majority of jobs and 
local capital rely on this industry (Carter, 2009).  The foot and mouth disease struck Britain in 
2001 with a vengeance, killing over a thousand livestock (Cameron & Pate, 2003) with millions 
more voluntarily killed or destroyed to prevent the spread of the disease (Leatherbury, 2003).  
Furthermore, to prevent the disease from spreading from Great Britain, the European Union 
placed an embargo on British meat.  In turn, the United States placed a temporary ban on meat 
imports from the entire European Union and Chile.  To control the spread of the disease in 
Britain, limits were placed on movement of people and equipment throughout the area.  Overall, 
foot and mouth disease cost British companies 30 billion dollars, with a 300,000 dollar average 
loss to large businesses and a 75,000 dollar loss to small businesses (Pratt, 2004).  If such a 
disease were used as a biological attack in Dodge City, Kansas, there would not only be a 
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significant impact on the regional economy, but also a ripple effect on the beef industry across 
the entire U.S. – not to mention health risks across the U.S. for those who could consume the 
infected meat.   
The zebra mussel case study, as well as the foot and mouth disease example, 
demonstrates the implications for all-threats, all-hazards homeland security and as such, 
necessary action steps must be taken to learn from this event.  The application of information 
sharing practices implemented by state and local law enforcement serve as an appropriate 
foundation on which these necessary action steps can be based.   
 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
A significant characteristic of a successful intelligence-led policing approach to threat 
prevention and mitigation is the reliance on informal relationships to increase information 
sharing.  Although these relationships can be as simple as a police officer and conservation 
officer meeting for coffee at the same place in the morning and letting one another know what 
has been going on in their respective patrol areas, they often provide the circumstance by which 
a threat comes to law enforcement’s attention.  Moreover, as conservation officers continue to 
enhance community awareness of suspicious activity the more the odds of preventing crimes and 
threats shifts to their advantage.  A more formal approach to information sharing would involve 
communication between conservation departments and state fusion centers.  As intelligence-led 
policing relies on the analysis of information, fusion centers serve as a viable mechanism by 
which conservation and law enforcement can both benefit.  Formal communication channels 
usually take the form of an electronic information sharing system (such as the Regional 
Information Sharing System or the Homeland Security Information Network) and provide real-
time access to threats and crime trends in specific geographic areas.  
As in the case study of zebra mussels discussed herein, threats to homeland security can 
have many faces and a wide range of intentions.  Increased awareness to identify possible threats 
and/or persons involved in threats could help thwart the spread of invasive species such as zebra 
mussels.  For example, conservations officers can educate the boating community about how to 
identify zebra mussels on boats or in live wells that are going in and out of different water 
systems.  Not only will a more open dialogue between law enforcement and the community aid 
in the prevention of spreading invasive species, but it also allows conservation officers to track 
such spreading if it does occur and gather information that may better inform their efforts to 
prevent or mitigate potential negative impacts.  Lastly, conservations officers can better explore 
the benefits of developing partnerships with the private sector – specifically organizations that 
suffer financial damage from invasive species such as hydroelectric plants – to not only create 
opportunities for two-way information flow, but also perhaps opportunities to gain more 
resources.  For example, if a hydroelectric company is spending two million dollars annually 
combating the spread of zebra mussels that are clogging their water intake pipes, it could be 
beneficial to spend a fraction of that money towards a preventive partnership that could mitigate 
the problem.     
Specific recommendations for policy and “action-steps” to guide those tasked with 
carrying out this integration are sorely needed.  However, given space considerations and the 
litany of variations these recommendations could take across the fragmented law enforcement 
structure within the U.S., such a discussion is beyond the scope of the present study.  Similar to 
15 
 
traditional law enforcement agencies, conservation agencies are tasked with a variety of 
responsibilities and jurisdictional differences depending on their location and constituents.  
Studies examining law enforcement homeland security preparedness have found that even small 
agencies in close proximity to a major urban area are going to have advanced functions due to 
risks associated with major urban areas (Schafer et al., 2009).  The same holds true for 
conservation agencies.  For example, a conservation agency located (or operating) near Detroit, 
Michigan is likely engaged in suspicious activity reporting along the waterways given Detroit’s 
status as a major urban area under the Urban Area Security Imitative (UASI) as well as the city’s 
proximity along the U.S.-Canada border.  In contrast, many other conservation agencies in rural 
areas that may have the same demographics as an agency near a major urban area are not likely 
to be engaged in suspicious activity reporting.  A comprehensive discussion as to how varying 
conservation agencies can integrate an intelligence-led approach and enhance the homeland 
security mission is needed to both advance research as well as inform professionals tasked with 
this responsibility.   
 Furthermore, as it has been discussed throughout this article, homeland security efforts 
are in a position to capitalize on an existing rural American infrastructure already established by 
conservation officers throughout the United States.  By utilizing initiatives that are inexpensive 
and based primarily on informal information sharing and awareness programs, conservation 
officers and the rest of the law enforcement community can increase the flow of raw information, 
increase citizen awareness, increase inter-jurisdictional collaboration for a variety of crime and 
threat problems, increase preparedness, mitigation, and response capabilities while continuing to 
decrease America’s vulnerability to a wide range of threats.  Such an enhancement for 
preparedness is also cost effective as little resources are likely needed to integrate conversation 
officers into the homeland security role.  No additional hardware or resources are needed to 
fulfill this capacity aside from training and educating conservation personnel on what to be 
aware of and how to report and respond to suspicious activities.    
 Lastly, there is a significant need for future research to be focused on the issues 
presented.  As was noted, the existing knowledgebase regarding conservation officers’ roles, 
responsibilities, and activities is largely unexplored within academic literature.  Scholars need to 
examine the national framework of conservation officers as it applies to their general functions.  
A host of similar research exists related to state and local law enforcement.  For example, the 
Law Enforcement Management and Administrative Statistics (LEMAS) survey conducted by the 
Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Department of Justice occurs every four years with a national 
sample to examine multiple constructs related to the tasks, resources, and organizational 
characteristics of state and local police.  Though conservation officers are largely considered to 
be state law enforcement officers, conservation agencies are not included in the LEMAS survey.  
Such an assessment specifically for conservation departments every four years is likely 
unnecessary, yet a similar national survey would help to illustrate the current conservation 
officer environment in the U.S. and would enhance the ability of scholars to provide context and 
empirical validation to their research while simultaneously using evidence to inform policy 
decisions.  
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Notes 
 
1. Examples of biological species include Feral pigs can be used to carry the Nipah virus 
and spread disease to humans, cattle and wildlife; the Heartwater pathogen, a microbe 
that can cause heart and pulmonary edema, and carried by the tropical bont tick, can kill 
deer, cattle or other wildlife, and potentially be transmitted to humans; the Striga, a plant 
parasite that can destroy corn crops, and subsequently devastate commodity markets and 
bio-fuel production, and Barberry plants that are eaten by birds whose droppings spread 
wheat stem rust, which can cause a decline or destruction of wheat production (Roberge, 
2012). 
2. These districts are commonly referred to as one of the following: Land Conservation 
Departments, Natural Resource Conservation Districts, Natural Resources Districts, 
Resource Conservation Districts, Soil Conservation Districts, or Soil & Water 
Conservation Districts. 
3. 28 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 23 is a guideline for law enforcement 
agencies. It contains implementing standards for operating federally grant-funded 
multijurisdictional criminal intelligence systems. It specifically provides guidance in five 
primary areas: submission and entry of criminal intelligence information, security, 
inquiry, dissemination, and the review-and-purge process (Institute for Intergovernmental 
Research, 2009). 
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